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Introduction
People's perceptions are 'reference dependent' (Kahneman, 2002:459) . The references re ‡ect our aspirations or expectations about a given outcome. They determine our sense Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics and management. E-mail: agr.int@cbs.dk.
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of entitlement, our perception of what is 'fair'or appropriate. Consequently, the utility that we assign to a given outcome depends on how this outcome positions in comparison to our reference point (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006 ). An increasing number of theoretical and empirical papers show that reference points importantly in ‡uence our attitude towards risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , our motivation to exert e¤ort (Akerlof and Yelen, 1990 ) and other economic choices (Camerer et al., 1997; Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003 ; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, Georgellis et al., 2008) . This paper analyses how the compensation contracts adjust to an 'outside'change in the reference value for executive pay. The behavioral theory in fact predicts that such adjustments will take place. It is not di¢ cult to imagine that the parties would look outside the existing contract to see whether they are being treated fairly and consequently, try to re-negotiate better terms. This is particularly so when the 'new'reference value is far apart from the values stipulated in the contract (Hart and Moore, 2006) . These new values will also condition the stipulation of new contracts since, in bargaining, the parties evaluate the potential outcomes in relation to their reference point (Copte and Jehiel, 2003; Li, 2004) . The results of our empirical analysis indeed con…rm that compensation contract adjust towards the new reference value for executive pay. This adjustments occur gradually and displays no asymmetry or non-linearity; the impact of the reference wage does not seem to be outweighed by the downwards rigidity of the salaries observed by some other studies.
Our study complements the previous literature in many important aspects. The empirical studies so far start with the assumption that the reference points are endogenous to each individual and thus, determined by the individual's past, pre-event experience or upon the individual's comparison with a chosen reference group. The validity of these studies consequently depends on how well they de…ne the 'relevant' reference group or capture people's expectations. No such concerns apply in our case since we dispose with a clear and well-de…ned measure of reference values for executive pay. By applying the behavioral theory to study the dynamics of executive compensation, this paper also Regardless on how one de…nes it, a departure from the reference point introduces an additional 'gain-loss'components in an individual's utility function (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) . To put it di¤erently, the utility that an individual associates to a given outcome ('perceived utility') will be determined by both, the outcome and its relation to a posited reference point. People will consequently derive di¤erent utilities and adopt di¤erent actions according to where a given outcome stands in relation to their reference value.
According to the prospect theory, for instance, the utility function breaks at the reference point and is considerably steeper for losses than for gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 The Criteria on the executive pay were drafted in a very speci…c time of Slovenian transition. The conclusion of the privatization process in the mid-90ties brought for 1 The de…nition of …rm size and consequently, the classi…cation of …rms in di¤erent size-groups, followed the de…nitions of the Slovenian Company Act (1993). 2 For instance, they suggested that the option exercise price should not be lower than the average stock price from the preceeding year with no adjustments for market return. In the period of our analysis and of the introduction of the Criteria, the average annual return of the Slovenian Stock Market Index 25.8 percent per year. the …rst time real owners to Slovenian enterprises. This change implied a gradual redistribution of power from managers and employees to the new owners. The adoption of the Criteria was one way for Slovenian managers to increase their share in corporate rents, to publicly legitimize their income aspirations. As stated by one of the constitutive members of the Association: 'the Criteria were designed to guarantee an appropriate pay in the times of …nancial distress....There is no pay limit for a good manager. The only upper limit for the pay is its public acceptance. We need to actively in ‡uence the acceptance of proposed pay levels. As pay ratios are now larger than before, we need to keep reconciling ours and public views on the subject as long as the new pay ratios are not perceived as appropriate and fair.' (Piskar, 2004, p. 19) .
Hypotheses
For most of the Slovenian executives (see section 4), the Criteria introduced a reference point that was well above their actual salaries. The behavioral theories suggest that this raise in the reference point should reduce the utility that the manager assigns to the existing compensation (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006 ). This should consequently stimulate an adjustment process in the executive compensation towards the reference values. We can think of several factors that would drive such adjustments. First, the higher in‡uence point will in ‡uence the bargaining for new compensation contracts. Copte and Jehiel (2003) propose a bargaining theory in which agents evaluate their utility according to reference points rather than outside options. Second, the change in the reference value for manager induce a re-negotiation of the current contracts. Given the substantial di¤erence between this new reference and the contract terms, the managers will very likely adopt the new reference and evaluate the contracts accordingly (Hart and Moore, 2006 ). This may consequently lead to shading and retaliation or, reduced e¤ort (Hart and Moore, 2006; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). The owners may thus …nd it optimal to raise the level of compensation closer to the new reference values. Finally, the increase in the marginal utility of their income will stimulate the managers to make signi…cant attempts to raise their future income (Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003) . There are several ways through which managers can actually in ‡uence the wage-setting process and undertake actions that bring his compensation closer to the reference values. The power of managers to in ‡uence their own pay has recently emerged as a compelling explanation of the sub-optimal pay-practices across the world (Bebchuk et al., 2001 ). Thus, we expect to observe pay raises for the managers whose earnings are below the reference values, determined by the Criteria on the executive pay. We however expect that these adjustment will be gradual. It takes time to replace the existing contract or to negotiate a new one. A number of other empirical studies indicate that the executive compensation is subject to an adjustment process and that …rms are not able to adjust instantly to a new equilibrium levels (see for instance, Canarella 
Empirical framework
The main aim of our paper is to explore the impact of reference values on the level of executive pay. For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we de…ne the dependent variables as the log of real annual compensation. The reference values are de…ned in line with the recommendations of the 'Criteria'for managerial compensation. In this paper, we refer to these reference levels as the 'normative'compensation levels. The multiplier varies with …rm size and equals 4 for small …rms, 6 for medium-sized …rms and 8 for large …rms:
The choice of our explanatory variables (Control variables) relies on the previous literature in the …eld of executive pay (for a review, see for instance, Murphy, 1999). In line with the agency theory, we expect that the executive salary will increase with improved …rm performance. In regard to the latter, we construct a measure of relative …rm performance, that is the di¤erence between the …rm's and the industry Return on Assets (ROA-ROAind) and by the average …rm labor productivity ('Log of Labor productivity').
Optimal contracts should also reward the manager for the complexity of her job, which we measure by the total number of …rm employees ('Log of Employment'). We control for the impact of the managerial labor market: we expect the more quali…ed executives to be paid a higher wage. We thus construct a dummy variable 'CEO college Dummy', which equals one for the CEOs who hold at least a College degree and zero otherwise.
Apart from the variables re ‡ecting the owners' need to compensate the CEO's e¤ort and to attract the most highly quali…ed executives, the level of managerial compensation may depend on other factors. According to the managerial power theory ( With regard to the former, The Blundell-Blond (1998) estimator is however more appropriate when the variables are close to random walk. When this is the case, the lagged levels of the endogenous variables are weak instruments for the …rst-di¤erenced variables.
The Blundell-Bond (1998) accounts for this ine¢ ciency by including both lagged levels and the lagged di¤erences of the endogenous variables. Since our data suggest that managerial pay follows the unit root, the Blundell-Bond (1998) is the appropriate estimator in our case.
Robustness check
In the estimation of the Models (1, 2 and 4-5), we only include the …rm-observations, for which the change in the salary refers to the same executive. That is, we only include …rm, where the same manager remained on the position in the consecutive years to which the change refers. It seems reasonable to assume that the compensation of the surviving managers di¤ers from the compensation of the managers that were replaced during the period of our analysis. This introduces a potential sample-selection bias. We correct for the latter by a joint estimation of the compensation equation and the sample selection 
Here i denotes manager, j denotes …rm and t denotes time period. The sample of …rms and CEO annual salaries used in estimations is not complete.
We excluded micro and small …rms, where separation of ownership and management is less frequent. In such …rms, compensation practices follow tax minimizing objectives and are less prone to rent extraction problems. We also exclude …rms for which we could not …nd an employee with a CEO occupation code. Third, due to use of lagged variables in estimations, we excluded …rms without data for at least three consecutive observations. 
Summary statistics
This section provides basic descriptive statistics for the sample of …rms and CEOs used in empirical analysis. The key …rm-level statistics are shown in Table 1 ). Most of the …rms (60 percent) belong to the mining, manufacturing and private utilities, followed by construction and trade. This paper focuses on the change in the average executive salary, which followed the introduction of the Criteria on the executive compensation in 1997. As evidenced in Table   Table 4 , the average pay of the CEO 5 has been raising towards the 'reference'pay during the period of our analysis. This adjustment if observed in all types of …rms, regardless their organizational form. However, as evidence in Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 1and 2 below, the convergence towards the reference pay in the limited liability corporations In public stock corporations managerial pay initially started at much higher initial values:
0.863 and 0.828 in medium and large …rms respectively. At the end of the period (2004), the average wage of the executives in these …rms exceed the reference wage, which was determined in the Criteria on the executive compensation. Table 5 shows the dynamics of average and standard deviation of actual to normative pay ratio only for …rms that were present in the data set in all years of available data. Also for this narrower set of …rms, we observe an increase in the average actual to normative pay ratio. 7 Moreover, the standard deviations of the distributions increased for all three sets of …rms. The observed pattern of adjustments towards the reference pay is further con…rmed also in Figures 1 and 2 , which compare the distribution of the ratio between actual and reference wage for the three groups of …rms in 1995 and 2004. 8 As shown in Figure 1 , the distribution of …rms in 1995 does not di¤er much between the three corporate groups.
Over time however, only the distributions for public and private corporations ‡attened (increase in variance) and achieved mean ratio close to 1 on average. The distinction in evolution of pay between private limited companies and corporations is even more pronounced when we consider the share of managerial pay in the total value added. The numbers are reported in Table 6 below. The percentage of average managerial pay in the total value added of private limited corporations altogether barely increased by 0.1 percentage points in the 1995-2004 period, whereas in private and public corporations the increase was more substantial: from 1.820 to 2.611 percent and from 1.304 to 1.702 percent, respectively. 8 The distributions of actual-to-normative pay ratios are shown using the method of stochastic kernels, which is convenient when the total number of observations is not large. This nonparametric method for plotting size distributions generates smooth graphs. The method evaluates each point of the estimated density as a weighted sum of the data frequencies in the neighborhood of the point being estimated. In our case the weighting is a normal (gaussian) density. The size of bandwidth around the point of evaluation is 0.45, which is used throughout this paper. The larger is the bandwidth, the smoother is the estimated density. However, for our data, the qualitative features of the data are largely independent of selected bandwidth. 
Empirical results
The results of the Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic estimations are presented in Table 7 below. The Sargan test of the over-identifying restrictions con…rms the global validity In line with our expectations, the executive salary responds positively to aboveindustry performance. The corresponding regression coe¢ cient is positive, although not statistically signi…cant. We also …nd that the executives in the …rms with a larger number of employees on average receive higher salaries. Furthermore, the impact of the organizational form is positive and statistically signi…cant across all the model speci…cations.
This is somehow in line with the managerial power theory of executive pay (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . By de…nition, the ownership is more dispersed and the shareholders'control is lower in stock corporations than in the limited liability …rms. Consequently, the information asymmetry and the power of managers to demand for a higher pay is stronger in the former …rms, leading to a higher increase of the managerial pay. 9 No signi…cant e¤ect is however observed in relation to the size of ownership concentration: a higher concentration of ownership does not reduce the average increase in the executive pay, nor it in ‡uences the speed of adjustment towards the executives'reference value. This may be again due to the generally low level of ownership concentration in Slovenian …rms and the di¤erent impact of various types of main owners on …rm governance and the executive pay. This is certainly an issue that needs to be explored further. All the stated conclusions are mostly con…rmed in the speci…cations 3 and 6, where we account for the possible sample selection bias. The negative and signi…cant sign of the Mills ratio suggest that the poorly performing executives (with a higher probability of replacement) receive on average lower salaries. The impact of other, manager-speci…c variables (e.g. age, education) is not signi…cant. This, in our view, re ‡ects the weakness of the managerial labor market in a post-transition economy, such as Slovenia.
Summary and concluding remarks
The increasing levels of executive compensation and the disappointing evidence on the optimality of compensation contracts cast serious doubts on the e¢ ciency of compensation schemes in motivating managerial e¤ort in the US and Europe. Despite the alternative explanations on what may motivate people's behavior, a number of theoretical and empirical evidence shows that our actions can be partly explained by the desire to reach some 'reference'income, which we consider as a 'fair'compensation for our e¤ort. This paper describes the example of a new European country, where the institutional changes induced a signi…cant re-distribution of power away from the …rm managers to the newly arising owners. In order to preserve their share in the corporate rents, the managers joined their forces and self-determined the levels of a 'fair'remuneration of their work.
This 'fair'or normative wage arti…cially introduced a new reference value for executive income, which was well above the current levels of the executive pay. Not only. The way it was de…ned opened few options through which the executives could actually in ‡uence their own salaries (i.e. by increasing the size of their …rms or by raising the average level of employee wages). In spite of the speci…cs in the introduction of the new reference value, this new reference point signi…cantly in ‡uenced the subsequent dynamics in (results not reported). The latter can be partly due to the fact that a large number of minority shareholders and relatively dispersed ownership characterises both, public and private stock corporations.
the executive salaries. The observed adjustments provide new and robust evidence on the validity of the predictions of the behavioral theorists regarding the importance of reference values for individuals'behavior. In addition, our results imply that these adjustments are partially based on the increases of the average employee wages, which are not associated with improvements in the labor productivity. The executive salaries also tend to increase more in the …rms with stronger managers. These results and the facts surrounding the introduction of the new reference value for the executive compensation provide a country-example in support to the managerial power theory of executive pay.
